Jeff Roberson—AP¹

   

Units in full tactical gear stand at the ready. Bulletproof vests drape over the chest of each man, their heads covered by bulletproof helmets. Just behind them stand personnel equipped with carbine assault rifles, fingers resting tensely just above the trigger. Next to and behind these persons, sit two armored vehicles, the likes of which have been seen in streets in the Iraq and Afghanistan; vehicles built to be resistant to both bullets and explosives. Atop these armored vehicles lies two snipers, whose high-power, high-velocity rifles are aimed at the crowd less than 200 feet away. Looking through the scopes on their rifles, the men are prepared to fire.

 

Hearing this description, one may suspect the crowd across from this armed unit to be an angry mob, brandishing weapons of their own amidst a tense standoff. This, however, is not the case. The crowd, the focus of this armed attention, consists of men, women, and children of all ages. These same individuals who have gathered calmly to express a common voice of concern and frustration. Not a single person within this group is armed, yet they have the attention of several rifles trained directly on them, with dozens more just an arm’s movement away.

 

The question then goes to ‘who is this armed unit aiming weapons at non-violent citizens?’ Many would think it is perhaps the Army or the Marines, giving consideration to the equipment, vehicles, and weapons that this unit possesses. This, again, however, is not the case. This armed unit consists solely of members of the local police and sheriff’s departments, utilizing their own equipment and resources. This was the scene that unfolded on August 13, 2014 in Ferguson, MO amidst the protests following the shooting death of unarmed Michael Brown by a Ferguson police officer.

 

Since the 1990’s, the militarization of state and local police departments has been a growing issue. In order to combat this, we must end the transfer of military surplus to local law enforcement agencies, we must institute military style training in the use of this surplus for departments that retain this equipment, and we must reinforce the notion that the public is not the enemy, and that police are not soldiers.

 

Beginning in 1990, Congress “authorized the Pentagon to transfer its surplus property free of charge to federal, state, and local police departments to wage the war on drugs” (Harwood). Under the guise of waging the war on drugs, state and local law enforcement agencies requested, and were subsequently given, military surplus equipment, including equipment such as armored vehicles, assault rifles, tactical gear (as seen in Image 1), grenade launchers, etc. Furthering this transfer, the government enacted Program 1033 of the Defense Authorization Bill in 1997, expanding the transfer of equipment to address counterterrorism needs. (Harwood). Under these two Congressional actions, state and local law enforcement agencies were poised to become a militarized domestic police force.

 

In order to fully understand what is meant by a ‘militarized police force’, it is necessary to know what exactly the term ‘militarized’ means in this context. The term ‘militarization’ stems from the word ‘militarism’, which is “the belief or desire of a government or people that a country should maintain a strong military capability and be prepared to use it aggressively to defend or promote national interests” (Google Search). While this definition speaks on a national level, it can be applied in a more localized way. Using this definition, the militarization of the police implies the use of military style tactics and equipment by the police to sequester a local populous. The problem with this, however, is that police officers and their departments are not the military; they are domestic law enforcement.

 

The role of the army and the police differ greatly, and for obvious reasons. The police are designated for enforcing domestic law and keeping the peace, and are subsequently equipped and trained to do so. The army, on the other hand, is designated to defending our country from foreign threats and fighting battles, and subsequently, is equipped and trained to do so. The intertwining of these two bodies is where problems begin to arise.

 

By providing military grade equipment to local law enforcement agencies without proper training in the use and deployment of such equipment, officers find themselves in unfamiliar situations equipped with new, powerful weaponry and an eagerness to use it. Untrained in the military’s Rules Of Engagement, officers often end up provoking further issues and confrontations because of this weaponized display.

 

Along with a shift in relationship between the police and the public, the possession of this equipment alters a police officer’s mind, giving them the power and equipment of a soldier without any of the proper training. The police officer is no longer a civil servant, but a soldier of the streets combatting the enemy, even though this ‘enemy’ is the civilian public.

 

In allowing the transfer of military equipment to local law enforcement agencies, we have created a militarized domestic police force who, for the most part, have not received the proper training that goes along with the use and deployment of said equipment. This training includes the understanding the proper situations in which to use this equipment, rules of engagement, etc. This transfer has altered the role of the police in the United States. No longer are they limited to simple ‘cops vs. robbers’ style crime fighting; police are able to transform into ‘soldiers’ on a moment’s notice. This shift, however, has not only caused a deterioration in the relationship between the police departments and the public, but also fostered a change of mindset amongst police officers that they are no longer just police officers, but also soldiers of the street waging a war against the citizens of the United States.

 

Before we can truly understand the ramifications of a militarized domestic police force, it is important to know how this militarization came into effect. In 1988, Congress enacted the Byrne Grant Programs contained within the Anti-Drug Abuse Act. The Byrne Grant Programs “gave state and local police federal funds to enlist in the government’s drug war” (Harwood). With this grant money, state and local departments created and up-armored “multi-jurisdictional narcotics task forces” (Harwood). Because of the way money was determined to be distributed to various departments around the nation, these task forces, or SWAT teams, were incentivized to carry out more raids, make more arrests, and seize more property. The higher these numbers, the more money the department would receive to further fund this armament. Once departments receive this money, there is very little oversight as to how this money is spent, and it is very difficult to receive records of this as well. According to Harwood, “when the ACLU requested SWAT records from 255 law enforcement agencies as part of its investigation, 114 denied them” (Harwood). Despite paying taxes for the police force in their community, the public is left in the dark as to how this money is spent, what exactly is received, and what the departments are using this equipment for. As of 2011, 585 task forces in the United States operate off of Byrne Grant funding.

 

Following the implementation of the Byrne Grant Programs, a new threat emerged in the 1990’s. Domestic terrorism shook the country in 1993 with the attack on the World Trade Center in New York, and again in 1995 with the Oklahoma City bombing. This prompted Congress to pass Program 1033, which “allows the DOD (Department of Defense) to transfer excess military equipment to state and local law enforcement agencies…with particular preference given to agencies that engage in counterdrug and counterterrorism activities” (Hall, 497). Program 1033 made it easier than ever for state and local law enforcement agencies to apply for military surplus equipment. This equipment includes “body armor, aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, riot gear, watercraft, and surveillance equipment” (Hall, 497). Following 9/11 state and local agencies have used Program 1033 much more frequently. And now, with the U.S.’s attempted withdraw from the Middle East, more military equipment is becoming available. In 2010 and 2011, “new records were set…with $212 and $500 million in transfers respectively” (Hall, 497). Since its inception, Program 1033 has transferred more than $4.3 billion worth of military surplus equipment to state and local law enforcement agencies (Harwood).

 

Along with knowing how this transfer of equipment came to be, it is important to know just what sort of equipment is being transferred, and where exactly it is being transferred to. In North Little Rock, Arkansas, “Police…received 34 automatic and semi-automatic rifles, two robots that can be armed, military helmets, and a Mamba tactical vehicle” (Harwood). Disturbingly, this is one of the lesser transfers of equipment. According to a Salt Lake City Tribune investigation, “The Utah Highway Patrol…got an MRAP [a massive bullet and explosive resistant armored vehicle designed specifically for militia combat]…and Utah Police received 1,230 [assault] rifles and four grenade launchers” (Harwood). What a police department needs a grenade launcher, let alone four of them for, is beyond me. Keene, New Hampshire, a town of 23,000 recently applied for, and was granted, an 8-ton armored personnel vehicle. Keene, which has had 2 murders in the last 15 years, is not exactly what most would consider a town in dire need of an armored vehicle. However, “the town cited on its application its annual Pumpkin Festival as a possible target for terrorists” (Reese). Yes, an annual Pumpkin Festival is considered a target for terrorism, and warrants an 8-ton armored vehicle for its protection.

 

Many of the states receiving the highest amount of military surplus are not exactly states that many would consider to have a ‘high terrorist potential’, yet they are still receiving this equipment. Looking back to Keene, it is clear that the ‘necessity’ of this equipment roughly translates into ‘If you really want it, we’ll give it to you’. Many of these states have absolutely no need for this equipment, yet because they have the potential to get it, they apply for it. This is somewhat frightening as small town police departments are becoming just as heavily armed as the Army or the National Guard.

 

Now that we have an understanding of creation of a militarized domestic police force, we can begin to delve into the problems that this militarization brings about. The militarization of the police creates a psychological stigma amongst police officers that they are no longer officers of the law, but soldiers of the street. Armed with assault rifles and bullet proof vests, officers take upon themselves the idea that they are ‘waging a war’ in the streets. Washington Post journalist Radley Balko refers to this as “the rise of the warrior cop – that is, the increasing tendency of some local police forces to rely on military style gear and tactics, even in situations that appear devoid of any real threat to officers’ safety” (Singal). This reliance deepens an officer’s belief that he is a ‘soldier’ as he no longer is limited to traditional policing tactics. The officer can provide his own heavy firepower, and if needed, call for the back-up of other armed officers and armored vehicles. Relating to this is the idea of the ‘weapons effect’. Essentially, the “theory underlying the weapons effect or similar kinds of phenomena would suggest that the more you fill the environment with stimuli that are associated with violence, the more likely violence is to occur” (Singal). By using a ‘show of force’, police departments tend to incite more conflict than they resolve. The police, dressed and protected by military gear, assume the role of soldiers, while the opposing side, typically protesters, begin to feel threatened and scared by a blatant display of power and weaponry. As Singal states, “To a certain extent, if you dress and treat people like soldiers facing a deadly enemy, they’ll act like it” (Singal). “Military equipment is used against an enemy…so if you give the same equipment to local police, by default you create an environment in which the public is perceived as an enemy” (Singal). This is a dangerous mindset for the police to possess, and leads into another problem that has arisen from the militarization of police in the United States.

 

More often than not, the presence of a militarily armed police force causes more problems than it solves, and tends to further distance the police from the communities that they serve. Referring to the gear worn by officers in Ferguson, MO, a member of the Army’s 82nd Airborne Division stated “We rolled lighter than that in an actual warzone” (Szoldra). This presence of military equipment is “counter-productive to domestic policing and needs to stop” (Szoldra). Instead of mitigating issues and coming to a resolution, the police put up an iron curtain, eliminating the possibility of any productive conversation. The people, in turn, feel threatened by this and lose even more trust in the police because they feel as though they are just being treated as criminals without a voice. As Szoldra sums up his article, “You can’t win a person’s heart and mind when you are pointing a rifle at his or her chest” (Szoldra).

 

Furthering this issue, police militarization undermines the growing trend in law enforcement of community policing. Community policing, which involves the cooperation of communities and the local police departments, is dependent upon an open and accessible police department. As Sklansky, a Stanford professor of law and former federal prosecutor states, “the strategy depends on building bridges between the police and the community, not on fortifying the police as a ‘thin blue line’” (Parker). In fortifying this ‘thin blue line’, the police again assume the ‘us against them’ mentality, viewing the public as enemy combatants.

 

Now that we have a solid understanding of the issues that the militarization of police in the United States can bring about, it is crucial to know what we can do about it. One of the most obvious and immediate solutions to this problem is to end the transfer of this equipment. This would come by way of abolishing the Department of Defense’s Program 1033. This program is, in essence, what has provided local and state law enforcement agencies the ability to obtain military surplus equipment. By abolishing this program, state and local law enforcement agencies would have a much more difficult time trying to obtain unnecessary military grade vehicles and weaponry. The restrictions are so minute in Program 1033 that anything that could even be remotely considered a target for terrorism is used as reasoning for needing an 8-ton armored vehicle.

 

Saying that we the people want to end Program 1033, however, is simply not enough. Citizens need to reach out to local mayors and governors, voicing their concerns about the over-armament of local police forces. Elected officials need to understand that this is something that a lot of citizens are concerned about, and by voicing this concern, those officials will need to take note.

 

Ending Program 1033 will not be a fix-all solution. The war on drugs is one of the leading causes for this transfer of equipment. Ending Program 1033 will make it somewhat more difficult for this transfer to take place, but local agencies will still cite the need for this equipment due to the war on drugs. While this is a completely separate issue, I think it is important to mention the role that the war on drugs plays in transferring this equipment to police departments.

 

Eliminating Program 1033 is only part of the solution. Even if we manage to end the transfer of equipment, there are still hundreds, if not thousands of departments across the country that already possess military surplus equipment. Because of this, it is necessary to implement some sort of formal, regulated training that will teach these officers that, first and foremost, they are not soldiers; they are police officers. Secondly, this training will teach the officers how and when to properly use this equipment if absolutely necessary. This training will be similar to the Army’s Rules of Engagement, which, among other things, discusses the proper display of force, crowd control techniques, and oppositional engagement. Because the police officers are using military equipment, they should be required to receive military style training in the use of said equipment. By teaching the officers the proper way to handle various situations, officers will become aware that an absolute show of force will often make a situation much worse than it will make it better. This is something that the Army instills into its soldiers, and because of this has prevented countless situations from escalating to a much more hostile incident. Training the police will allow for a much more controlled response from them, and a much calmer reaction from the crowd/opposition.

 

With this training, the number of instances in which this equipment is used should decrease dramatically. Often times, this equipment is used without warrant because the equipment is there and officers want to use it. Through training, it should become clear that using this equipment will not solve every problem, and can often make things worse. By reducing the use of this equipment, both lives and money can be saved, relationships between the public and the police can be improved, and there is a chance that the police will lessen their ‘soldier-like’ mindset that seems to have consumed departments across the country.

 

Inversely to these remedies is what will happen if nothing is changed. Without any sort of counteraction, police departments around the country will continue to arm themselves as heavily as they can, receiving more and more military surplus equipment as it becomes available. With this, the police will become an overpowering force to which no one can contest. Regular protests and public displays of concern will be increasingly met with armored vehicles and automatic weaponry. This will further distance the police from the public, until eventually there is no connection. The police will enforce their power, and the public will be powerless to retort. Any display of contradiction will be met by supreme force.

 

This is essentially when our country will fall into a full-fledged police state. There will be no communication between the police and the public except for which new laws are being set in place. The police will fortify themselves as a standing army, rivaled only by the National Guard or other militant arm of the government. This is a dangerous situation, because once it has begun, it will become increasingly more difficult to stop; the further the police delve themselves into a military style operation, the harder it will be for the public to attempt to counteract it.

 

Of course, this is a worst case scenario, but it is truly the only outcome possible if this continues. The police are already distancing themselves from the public, and if nothing is done, it will only continue.

 

The problem of a militarized police force persists today, stronger than ever. By allowing the police to become such an armed force, officers have changed mindsets in the role that they play in serving the public. No longer do they look at themselves as police officers, but rather they see themselves as soldiers, fighting wars on the streets of the United States. This has led to a distancing between the police and public that they serve, as the police fortify themselves and the public feels distrusted and criminalized by the police. In order to combat this militarization it is necessary to end the transfer of equipment, implement proper training in the use and deployment of equipment already acquired by police departments subsequently decreasing the instances in which this equipment is used, and properly inform the public about the dangers if nothing is done about this.

​

​

¹ Roberson, Jeff, "Ferguson Police 2." TIME, August 13, 2014, https://time.com/3111474/rand-paul-ferguson-police/